關(guān)于組織應(yīng)收賬款管理戰(zhàn)略方針一些經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)文獻(xiàn)翻譯

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1、原文： A Strategic Approach on Organizing Accounts Receivable Management: Some Empirical Evidence 1. Introduction Firms rarely require immediate payment for their merchandise. For example, in the UK corporate sector more than 80% of daily business transactions are on credit terms and accounts recei

2、vable constitute one of the main assets on corporate balance sheets (35% of total assets) As soon as trade debtors settle their accounts, cash flows into the company. At the same time, however, new sales generate new accounts receivable. The level of debtors thus remains constant when sales figures

3、are stable, while it grows as sales figures increase. Although firms extending trade credit heavily invest in accounts receivable, the resulting financial need is not the only reason why trade credit decisions merit more careful attention. This paper develops and discusses two additional considerati

4、ons. First, firms selling on credit open themselves to moral hazard. When exchange relations are subject to imperfect information, this uncertainty results in transaction costs. Sellers thus have incentives to develop organizational structures that reduce the transaction costs resulting from this

5、asymmetric information problem. Both homemade planning and sales structuring as well as balanced product and market portfolios can reduce this uncertainty, while externalization of risk becomes attractive when these homemade institutions fail. Second, vendors offering trade credit have to adopt a

6、variety of new responsibilities: the decision whether or not to grant credit to a (new) customer, the assumption of credit-,administration- and collection-policies and the bearing of the credit risk involved. From a managerial point of view this means that the seller 1) finances the buyer’s inventor

7、y, 2) engages in additional accounting and collecting activities, 3) monitors the financial health of both existing and potential customers and 4) gets involved in assessing and bearing new risks. Not all credit management functions, however, have to be performed by the seller. Indeed, when extendin

8、g trade credit is thought to add no real value to the firm, its management can be contracted to a third party. A selling firm’s decision to extend trade credit thus also requires the seller to decide whether or not to integrate into managing accounts receivable. Moreover, when the seller decides t

9、o enter a market transaction, several organizational structures can be employed. In their paper, Mian and Smith (1992) examine the relationship between the functions to be performed in the credit-administration process and the decision whether or not to subcontract these functions to a third party s

10、pecialist. In this paper, however, the extension of trade credit is looked upon from both a more strategic and a risk-oriented point of view. The strategic approach is based on the extensive financial management literature claiming that the extension of trade credit can become advantageous to the su

11、pplier, in which there will be a need for flexibility in managing accounts receivable. The risk-oriented point of view, on the other hand, is based upon those principles that deal with the moral hazard problem. Finally, the implications of these motivational theories are linked to the industrial org

12、anization literature on vertical integration. Three types of outsourcing are considered. At first, the factoring contract has been chosen to operationalize the externalization of accounts receivable management, since factoring is the most comprehensive type of outsourcing a firm’s accounts receivabl

13、e management. Next, we clearly isolate the decision to subcontract the administration process from the decision to subcontract the risks incurred, assuming that they are based on different decision processes with different decision variables. Indeed, we assume that both cost advantages and a need fo

14、r flexibility in managing accounts receivable will cause integration of the firm’s credit administration. The assumption of credit risk, however, will not be delegated to a third party when the transaction can be performed in a stable and predictable environmental setting (inducing a low need for mo

15、nitoring and control). 2. The Nature of Outsourcing Contracts Before analyzing policy choices and their respective determinants, we first give a description of the basic governance structures studied. 2.1. FACTORING AND ITS EQUIVALENT Factoring basically offers three types of services: 1)

16、finance, 2) risk control and 3) sales ledger administration. However, not all factoring contracts provide this full array of services. Based upon the scope of his managerial needs the seller can decide on the extensiveness of the contract. The most important distinction between factoring contracts i

17、s that between recourse and non-recourse agreements. A non-recourse agreement implies that the factor makes the credit-extension decision, monitors and collects the accounts receivable and bears the credit risk. Under a recourse agreement the firm selling on credit retains the risk of non-recovery o

18、f the debt. Moreover, when the contract provides financing, the factoring contract is called an advance-factoring contract. A full-factoring agreement then is a non-recourse agreement, providing financing for all credit sales (both national sales and export). The equivalents internalizing their acco

19、unts receivable management finance their accounts receivable out of general corporate credit and manage internally the credit-risk assessment, credit-granting, credit-collection and credit-risk bearing functions. 2.2. THE ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT The companies using an administrative

20、management contract are defined as those companies that use credit information agencies to assess the trade credit risks, to collect accounts receivable when they are due or ARF (Accounts Receivable Financing)-contracts and service contracts offered by a factor. Thus, although the administration of

21、accounts receivable has been outsourced, the firm still bears the trade credit risk. 2.3. THE RISK MANAGEMENT CONTRACT The risk management contract is defined as a contract that indemnifies firms against losses on uncollected accounts receivable but does not take care of the firm’s credit admin

22、istration process. Examples of such third party specialists are e.g. credit insurance contracts and partial factoring agreements. 3.Determinants of Alternate Policies The factoring contract has been chosen to operationalize the full externalization of accounts receivable management. Next, we a

23、ssume that the decision to outsource this management is in?uenced by the need for ?exibility in extending trade credit and collecting payments on the one hand and the existence of economies of scale and scope reducing the unit cost of management on the other. Further, such a need for ?exibility and

24、 control is assumed to be induced by the existence of real motives for extending trade credit. Indeed, when these motives hold, trade credit contributes to the process of maximizing shareholder wealth, a traditional objective in ?nancial management literature, and becomes a strategic asset that is n

25、ot likely to be extended to a third party. Next, the effects of uncertainty and bounded rationality in managing accounts receivable are studied, assuming that the supplier’s risk increases as a result of uncertainty in the customer’s payment behavior and uncertainty in the supplier’s business enviro

26、nment. The less predict-able the customer’s payment behavior, the higher the uncertainty in the supplier’s ?nancial needs, all other things being equal. Therefore, the assumption of the credit risk becomes less attractive whenever the customer’s payment behavior is hard to predict. In addition, two

27、 types of environmental uncertainty have been withheld: the possibility to control the customer’s payment behavior (based on the absence of information-asymmetry) and the possibility to spread the risks incurred. Therefore, trade credit administration is described as the process of monitoring and co

28、llecting the outstanding accounts receivable. Moreover, since one cannot bear the consequences of decisions controlled by a third party, it is reasonable to assume that ?rms deciding to internalize the collection of their accounts receivable will also internalize the credit granting decision. The ri

29、sk assumption includes the assumption of all responsibilities in case of late and/or bad payments. 3.1 THE DSO-RATE Since in the traditional literature on accounts receivable management the average number of days’ sales outstanding (DSO) is often mentioned to be the primary reason for outsourci

30、ng, the DSO rate has been withheld for further analysis. Indeed, the pure financial theories on trade credit stress the fact that high DSO-rates increase the supplier’s financial needs, increasing the likelihood of outsourcing. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that when the firm has no accounts

31、receivable (although it provides its customers with the opportunity to delay their payments), there won’t be any need for outsourcing its management. This results in the following hypothesis: Firms with a higher average number of days’ sales outstanding are more likely to outsource their accounts

32、receivable management. 3.2. COST ADVANTAGES Economies of scale and scope are expected to affect the outsourcing decision. Indeed, the ?xed costs associated with credit-risk assessment and monitoring and collection policies can be spread over a larger number of accounts as credit sales increase

33、. Firms with higher credit sales are therefore expected to invest in more specialized personnel, techniques and knowledge, enabling them to realize learning-effects. 3.3.NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY AND CONTROL: THE INCENTIVES FOR TRADE CREDIT EXTENSION The more recent developments in accounts receiva

34、ble management literature (e.g. Emery, 1988; Brick and Fung, 1984; Schwartz, 1974) all emphasize its potential strategic value which is usually translated into a set of motives causing trade credit extension. Among these we discern a pricing motive, an operating motive, a ?nanc-ing and a tax-based m

35、otive and a transaction motive. In what follows, each of them is brie?y discussed and translated into testable hypotheses. 3.3.1. The Pricing Motive The pricing motive is extensively described in Schwartz and Whitcomb (1978, 1979) and is based on the idea that both market structures and legal

36、 arrangements often restrict a ?rm’s pro?tability by constraining price competition in the market. In such circumstances trade credit not only becomes an effective tool in creating hidden price-cuts; it can also be used to practice sub-rosa price discrimination (by extending different credit terms t

37、o different customers). This price-setting objective results in the following hypothesis: Suppliers who use trade credit as a price setting variable are less likely to outsource their accounts receivable management. 3.3.2. The Operating Motive In addition, the operating motive for the exten

38、sion of trade credit assumes that ?rms with higher inventory storage costs can transfer these costs onto the buyer by extending trade credit. That way trade credit offers the opportunity to split up the inventory cost into an operational storage cost to be borne by the buyer and a ?nancial opportun

39、ity cost induced by the payment delay offered by the seller. Therefore, Firms, in particular those with seasonal sales ?gures, can have a strategic advantage in extending trade credit. This strategic potential, however, increases even more whenever the customer has a comparative advantage in stori

40、ng the delivered goods, which is more likely to occur when he transforms these into ?nished, non-perishable products. This results in the following hypothesis: Suppliers of semi-?nished products with seasonal sales ?gures are less likely to outsource their accounts receivable management. 3.3.3

41、. The Financial Motive The ?nance-based models for the extension of trade credit as developed by Emery (1984, 1987, 1988), Schwartz (1974) and Chant and Walker (1988) argue that ?rms with ready access to additional ?nancing will extend trade credit to ?rms facing higher ?nancing costs or restricte

42、d ?nancing options. That way, the stronger and more liquid selling companies can help ?nance the growth of their smaller and more vulnerable customers, thereby enlarging and safeguarding their own future markets. Since these ?rms have incentives to act as a banker, they will be less inclined to outs

43、ource their control in managing accounts receivable. This results in the following hypothesis: The more liquid suppliers are less likely to outsource their accounts receivable management. 3.3.4. The Tax-based Motive Even in perfectly competitive ?nancial markets with homogeneous interest rat

44、es, trade credit can act as a redistributor of wealth since high tax paying suppliers have a lower after-tax ?nancing cost. That way, the tax-based models as introduced by Brick and Fung (1984a, 1984b) see trade credit as a redistributor of tax advantages between buyer and seller. They ?nally conclu

45、de that “ sellers with high effective tax rates will supply more trade credit and are therefore more likely to have a longer investment in accounts receivable”. Frank and Maksimovic (1995) follow this reasoning stating that the higher the supplier’s tax rate, the higher his comparative tax advantage

46、 will be and the more willing he will be to invest in trade credit. His lower after-tax ?nancing cost induces the same incentives as discussed under the ?nancing motive, resulting in the hypothesis that: Suppliers who are in a higher tax-bracket are less likely to outsource their accounts receivab

47、le management. Source: Greet· Asselbergh, A Strategic Approach on Organizing Accounts Receivable Management: Some Empirical Evidence. Journal of Management and Governance,1999(3):pp15-20 譯文： 關(guān)于組織應(yīng)收賬款管理戰(zhàn)略方針：一些經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù) 1． 簡介 企業(yè)很少需要為他們的商品立即付款。例如，在英國企業(yè)界超過80%的日常業(yè)務(wù)交易還在信用期限中，應(yīng)收賬款成為構(gòu)成公司資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表

48、（總資產(chǎn)的35%）的主要資產(chǎn)之一。當(dāng)有應(yīng)收賬款回收入公司的賬戶，形成現(xiàn)金流量流入公司，與此同時(shí)，又有新的銷售產(chǎn)生新的應(yīng)收賬款。對(duì)債務(wù)人來說，當(dāng)它的銷售額增長債務(wù)水平卻保持不變。雖然公司擴(kuò)大貿(mào)易信貸、大量投資在應(yīng)收帳款所造成的財(cái)政需要的不是唯一的原因，但貿(mào)易信貸決策更需要仔細(xì)注意。本文研究和討論了兩個(gè)額外問題。 首先是企業(yè)對(duì)賒銷開發(fā)自己的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承受能力。當(dāng)交易關(guān)系受到不完全信息的影響，這種不確定性造成了交易成本。賣方因此鼓勵(lì)發(fā)展組織結(jié)構(gòu)產(chǎn)生的成本，降低了這個(gè)信息不對(duì)稱的問題。這兩種自制規(guī)劃和銷售結(jié)構(gòu)平衡的產(chǎn)品和市場的投資組合可以減少上述的不確定性,而風(fēng)險(xiǎn)外化使得這種不確定性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)開始導(dǎo)致這些自

49、制的機(jī)構(gòu)失敗。 第二，供應(yīng)商在提供貿(mào)易信貸時(shí)會(huì)采用一系統(tǒng)新職能：在決定是否將貿(mào)易信貸提供給一個(gè)新的信貸客戶，這涉及到信貸的管理和收集，信用政策以及信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的承擔(dān)。從管理的角度這意味著賣方必須做到1）了解買方的庫存；2）從事額外的會(huì)計(jì)和收集活動(dòng)；3）監(jiān)督現(xiàn)有和潛在客戶的財(cái)務(wù)狀況；4）評(píng)估和承受新的信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。但是并不是所有的信用管理職能都必須由賣方進(jìn)行。事實(shí)上，當(dāng)擴(kuò)大貿(mào)易信貸被認(rèn)為沒有給公司帶來真正的價(jià)值時(shí)，貿(mào)易信貸可以承包給第三方執(zhí)行。 一個(gè)銷售公司決定要擴(kuò)大貿(mào)易信貸也要求賣方來決定是否融入應(yīng)收賬款管理。此外，當(dāng)賣方?jīng)Q定進(jìn)入市場交易時(shí)一些組織結(jié)構(gòu)可以被采用。在米安和史密斯（1992）的論文中

50、研究了必須在信貸管理過程中執(zhí)行的職能，并決定是否將這些職能轉(zhuǎn)包給第三方專家的關(guān)系。在本文中，擴(kuò)展商業(yè)信用是更具戰(zhàn)略性和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)導(dǎo)向性的觀點(diǎn)。戰(zhàn)略手段是基于廣泛的財(cái)務(wù)管理文獻(xiàn)，它們聲稱擴(kuò)大貿(mào)易信貸對(duì)供應(yīng)商有利，但其中需要有靈活的應(yīng)收賬款管理。另一方面，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)導(dǎo)向性則是基于這些原則處理道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題。最后，這些激勵(lì)理論聯(lián)系在一起組成了垂直整合產(chǎn)業(yè)組織。有三種類型的外包會(huì)被考慮到。首先，由于保理業(yè)務(wù)是外包公司應(yīng)收賬款管理中最全面的類型，保理合同被選定為實(shí)施應(yīng)收賬款賬戶管理的具體化方式。接下來，我們清楚地區(qū)分決定轉(zhuǎn)包分包所產(chǎn)生的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理過程，假設(shè)它們是以不同的決策變量和不同的決策過程為基礎(chǔ)。事實(shí)上，我們認(rèn)為在

51、成本優(yōu)勢(shì)和再管理應(yīng)收賬款將造成該公司靈活管理貿(mào)易信用的需要。但是假設(shè)信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理不委托于第三方時(shí)，交易可以在一個(gè)穩(wěn)定和可預(yù)見的環(huán)境設(shè)定（包涵低需求的監(jiān)測和控制）中執(zhí)行。 2． 外包合同的性質(zhì) 在分析政策選擇和他們各自的決定因素之前，我們首先給出一個(gè)基本的治理結(jié)構(gòu)的描述研究。 2.1保理業(yè)務(wù)及其等效功能 保理業(yè)務(wù)基本上提供了三種類型的服務(wù)：1）金融；2）風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制；3）分賬戶銷售管理。然而，并非所有的保理合同都提供這種全套服務(wù)?；谒麄児芾淼男枰?，賣方可以決定合同范圍。保理合同之間最重要的區(qū)別是協(xié)議有追索權(quán)和無追索權(quán)。無追索權(quán)的協(xié)議意味著當(dāng)有因素使得信貸延期時(shí)，要監(jiān)控并收集應(yīng)收賬款

52、和承擔(dān)信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。根據(jù)協(xié)議，公司在追索賒銷上保留了非債務(wù)回收風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。此外，當(dāng)合同提供融資業(yè)務(wù)時(shí)，保理合同被稱為事前保理合同。全套保理合同是無追索權(quán)協(xié)議，為所有人提供信用銷售融資（包括國際銷售和出口）。其內(nèi)在等值一般企業(yè)的應(yīng)收賬款財(cái)務(wù)賬目管理、內(nèi)部信用的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估和授信，信貸收集和信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的職能。 2.2行政管理合同 企業(yè)使用行政管理合同意味著那些企業(yè)使用信用信息機(jī)構(gòu)以評(píng)估貿(mào)易信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，在應(yīng)收賬款收取到期時(shí)提供的一個(gè)應(yīng)收賬款融資合同和服務(wù)合同。因此，雖然應(yīng)收賬款的管理已經(jīng)外包，但企業(yè)仍帶有貿(mào)易信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。 2.3風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理合同 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理合同是指合同中約定了沒有考慮到該企業(yè)的信用管理過程

53、服務(wù)而導(dǎo)致應(yīng)收賬款無法收回使企業(yè)遭受損失。這樣的第三方專家的例子有：信貸保險(xiǎn)合同和部分保理協(xié)議。 3.代替政策的決定因素 保理合同已被選定為實(shí)施應(yīng)收賬款管理的具體化形式。接下來，我們假定外包這種管理的決定是由對(duì)擴(kuò)大貿(mào)易信貸和收集支付款項(xiàng)的靈活性的需要，另一方面是減少對(duì)其他單位成本管理存在范圍經(jīng)濟(jì)的靈活性。此外，這種靈活性和控制需要是假設(shè)由貿(mào)易信貸延長的真正動(dòng)機(jī)所致。事實(shí)上，當(dāng)存在這些動(dòng)機(jī)的約束，貿(mào)易信貸有助于為股東創(chuàng)造最大的財(cái)富，成為一個(gè)不太可能擴(kuò)展到第三方的戰(zhàn)略性資產(chǎn)。其次，對(duì)應(yīng)收賬款管理的不確定性和有限理性進(jìn)行了研究。假設(shè)客戶的付款行為及供應(yīng)商的商業(yè)環(huán)境的不確定性會(huì)導(dǎo)致供應(yīng)商的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)

54、增加，則對(duì)客戶支付行為的可確定性就越少，供應(yīng)商財(cái)務(wù)需求的不確定性就越高，其他所有條件都相等。因此，每當(dāng)客戶的付款行為是難以確定時(shí)，對(duì)信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的假設(shè)就變得不那么有吸引力。此外兩種環(huán)境類型的不確定性已經(jīng)扣除：控制客戶支付行為（在信息不對(duì)稱情況下）的可能性和擴(kuò)大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)費(fèi)用的可能性。因此，貿(mào)易信貸管理被描述為監(jiān)測和收集應(yīng)收未收賬戶的過程。此外，既然不能承擔(dān)由第三方控制決定的后果，這就有理由假設(shè)企業(yè)決定其內(nèi)在應(yīng)收賬款回收也將使得授信決策內(nèi)部化。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)包括產(chǎn)所有責(zé)任以防產(chǎn)生推遲付款和壞賬情況的假設(shè)。 3.1應(yīng)收賬款平均回收期 在傳統(tǒng)文獻(xiàn)中對(duì)應(yīng)收賬款平均回收期（DSO）已經(jīng)做了進(jìn)一步的分析研究，經(jīng)常

55、會(huì)有提到應(yīng)收賬款管理中的應(yīng)收賬款平均回收期是導(dǎo)致外包的首要因素。事實(shí)上，單純的財(cái)務(wù)貿(mào)易信貸理論使得高平均回收期出現(xiàn)和供應(yīng)商資金需求的增長。這增加了外包的可能性。此外，可以合理地假定，當(dāng)企業(yè)沒有應(yīng)收賬款（雖然給客戶提供了延遲付款的機(jī)會(huì)）就不會(huì)有任何外部管理的需要。這個(gè)假設(shè)的結(jié)果主要表現(xiàn)為：具有較高的應(yīng)收賬款平均回收天數(shù)的企業(yè)更可能需要進(jìn)行好自己的應(yīng)收賬款管理。 3.2成本優(yōu)勢(shì) 規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)和范圍經(jīng)濟(jì)預(yù)計(jì)將影響外包政策。事實(shí)上，當(dāng)信用銷售增加時(shí)信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估和監(jiān)測以及收款政策的固定費(fèi)用也會(huì)增加。有較高信用銷售的公司將投入更多的專業(yè)人才和技術(shù)知識(shí)。 3.3靈活性和控制能力的需要：貿(mào)易信貸的激

56、勵(lì)措施 在越來越多的對(duì)應(yīng)收賬款管理研究的最新文獻(xiàn)中（如艾美瑞，1988；布瑞克和方，1984；斯瓦茨，1974）都強(qiáng)調(diào)其潛在的戰(zhàn)略價(jià)值，這通常被翻譯為一系列造成貿(mào)易信貸的機(jī)制。其中，我們認(rèn)識(shí)到一個(gè)定價(jià)機(jī)制，一個(gè)經(jīng)營機(jī)制，一個(gè)財(cái)務(wù)和基于稅收機(jī)制以及一個(gè)交易機(jī)制。接下來，對(duì)它們進(jìn)行簡要介紹并轉(zhuǎn)化為可檢驗(yàn)的假說。 3.3.1價(jià)格機(jī)制 在斯沃特茲和惠特科姆（1978,1979）的文章中詳細(xì)介紹了價(jià)格機(jī)制，這是根據(jù)市場結(jié)構(gòu)和法律安排通常通過限制價(jià)格來限制市場競爭中公司的盈利能力為基礎(chǔ)的。在這種情況下，貿(mào)易信貸不僅成為創(chuàng)造隱藏削價(jià)的有效工具，也可以用來創(chuàng)造秘密價(jià)格歧視（通過擴(kuò)展不同信用條件和不同

57、客戶）。這個(gè)價(jià)格設(shè)置基于以下假設(shè)： 作為一個(gè)供應(yīng)商使用貿(mào)易信貸來設(shè)定價(jià)格是不太可能管理好自己的應(yīng)收賬款的。 3.3.2經(jīng)營機(jī)制 另外，為擴(kuò)大貿(mào)易信貸的經(jīng)營機(jī)制假設(shè)存貨成本較高的企業(yè)可以通過擴(kuò)大貿(mào)易信貸來轉(zhuǎn)移給買方支付。這樣，貿(mào)易信貸就提供了機(jī)會(huì)將存貨業(yè)務(wù)成本分為買方的機(jī)會(huì)成本和由賣方提供的延遲付款引起的存貨成本負(fù)擔(dān)。 因此，企業(yè)，特別是存在季節(jié)性銷售的企業(yè)可以有一個(gè)擴(kuò)大貿(mào)易信貸的戰(zhàn)略優(yōu)勢(shì)。然而當(dāng)客戶在貨物存儲(chǔ)中占優(yōu)勢(shì)時(shí)，這一戰(zhàn)略的潛在可能性會(huì)增加，這會(huì)使他們把這些轉(zhuǎn)換為不易變質(zhì)的產(chǎn)品。這個(gè)結(jié)論基于以下假設(shè)： 銷售季節(jié)性半成品的供應(yīng)商不太可能管理好自己的應(yīng)收賬款。 3.3.3

58、財(cái)務(wù)機(jī)制 埃默里（1989,1987,1988），斯瓦茨（1974），恰特和沃克（1988）的研究中對(duì)擴(kuò)大貿(mào)易信貸的財(cái)務(wù)模型認(rèn)為，中小企業(yè)和隨時(shí)獲得額外融資的企業(yè)擴(kuò)大貿(mào)易信貸會(huì)使企業(yè)面臨更高的融資成本或限制融資方案。這樣，更強(qiáng)大和更具流動(dòng)性的銷售公司可以對(duì)小型和自我保護(hù)力低下的客戶提供資助，從而來擴(kuò)大和維護(hù)自己的未來市場。由于這些企業(yè)有能力來充當(dāng)銀行家的角色，他們會(huì)不愿意外包自己的應(yīng)收賬款管理。這個(gè)結(jié)論基于以下假設(shè)： 越是靈活的供應(yīng)商越不會(huì)外包自己應(yīng)收賬款管理。 3.3.4基于稅收的機(jī)制 即使在完全競爭的同類利率的金融市場中，貿(mào)易信貸也可以作為財(cái)富再分配。因?yàn)槔U納高稅收的供應(yīng)商有一

59、個(gè)較低的稅后融資成本。這樣一來，布瑞克和方（1984）中提供的以稅收為基礎(chǔ)的模型把貿(mào)易信貸視為一種賣方和買方直接的再分配稅收優(yōu)惠政策。他們最后得出結(jié)論，“高實(shí)際稅率賣方將提供更多的貿(mào)易信貸，因此更可能有一個(gè)較長的應(yīng)收賬款投資”。弗蘭克和馬克思穆文思（1995）按照這種推理，指出供應(yīng)商稅率越高，他們的比較優(yōu)勢(shì)就越高也會(huì)更愿意投資于貿(mào)易信貸。他們較低的稅后財(cái)務(wù)成本產(chǎn)生了和財(cái)務(wù)機(jī)制中相同的激勵(lì)效果。這個(gè)結(jié)論基于一下假設(shè)： 擁有較高稅收負(fù)擔(dān)的供應(yīng)商不太可能外包自己的應(yīng)收賬款管理。 出處：[美]格利特·埃爾斯伯格，《關(guān)于組織應(yīng)收賬款管理戰(zhàn)略方針：一些經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)》，《管理及治理》期刊，1999（03），pp15-20。